This paper seeks to extend Ricoeur's acclaimed mediation of the Gadamer-Habermas debate. Freud's psychoanalytic practice was an important touchstone for the debate, and Ricoeur's reading of Freud provides a key to his critical intervention in the debate. The emerging postmodern account of psychotherapeutic practice provides a model of the critical hermeneutics that Ricoeur championed. Bringing Ricoeur's insights to bear on this model, we can advance the questioning spurred by the Gadamer-Habermas debate without pretending to bring closure to the unending conversation of thinking.
Introduction
One of Paul Ricoeur's enduring legacies is his sophisticated mediation of the famous debate between Hans-Georg Gadamer and Jürgen Habermas regarding the potential for, and scope of, social critique. In this paper, I first recount the Gadamer-Habermas debate, 
I. The Gadamer-Habermas Debate: Competing Interpretations of Psychoanalysis.
In Truth and Method, Gadamer argued that our truthful relation to the world subtends, but is not exhausted by, scientific methodologism. Against the ascendancy of technicalempirical rationality premised on the Enlightenment fantasy of a monadic, prejudice-free subject decoding the world of objects, Gadamer advocated a "philosophical hermeneutics."
Gadamer's analysis of the give-and-take of conversation provides the most vivid and succinct model of hermeneutical understanding. Beginning with the observation that "the more genuine a conversation is, the less its conduct lies within the will of either partner," he argued that the understanding emerging from a conversation is "like an event that happens to us." 3 Gadamer is making an ontological claim, asserting that human understanding is founded on a decentering "fusion of horizons." This experience is placed in sharp relief when two conversationalists find the path of their dialogue taking on a life of its own, and is masked when a scientist radically demarcates the scope of inquiry and seeks understanding only through methodological testing.
In the late 1960s, Habermas defended the Enlightenment faith that reason is sufficiently powerful to outline the path of social progress against Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics, notwithstanding Habermas's post-metaphysical acknowledgment that the Enlightenment conception of reason was mistakenly limited to empirical and logical modes of thinking. In On the Logic of the Social Sciences, he acknowledged Gadamer's powerful description of the fluidity of linguistic horizons that enable understanding through translation and accommodation to practical demands, but Habermas concluded that hermeneutic selfreflection devolves into irrationalism "when it posits hermeneutic experience as an absolute and fails to acknowledge the transcending force of reflection that is also at work in it." 4 Guided by Freudian psychoanalysis, he insisted that cultural tradition as developed in hermeneutical reflection must be subject to theoretical insight guided by rational reconstruction.
5
Habermas refined this critique by developing a philosophical anthropology of knowledge-constitutive interests. In Knowledge and Human Interests, he agreed that two distinct interests subtend technical-empirical inquiry and historical-hermeneutical inquiry.
Rejecting Gadamer's attempt to embed the former within the latter, he argued that the very recognition that human interest subtends empirical and hermeneutical knowledge reveals that reason is subject to a third interest: the interest in reason itself. Distinguished from the 6 technical manipulation of the natural world and the effort to reach a shared understanding with others, self-reflection arises from an independent yet co-primordial human interest in emancipatory reflection. Freud's psychoanalytic theory represents a decisive moment in our intellectual tradition precisely because it directly takes into account this "new dimension" of knowledge.
7
Habermas properly rejected Freud's scientistic self-understanding, but he offered Freud's psychoanalytic practice as a compelling model for social critique. The practicing 8 analyst is not just attempting to interpret ambiguous statements or actions, nor is she seeking a technical mastery of human physiology and neurology. Instead, the analyst guides the patient through a process of self-reflection that has an emancipatory effect by correcting internal disturbances below the level of every day hermeneutical understanding, disturbances that amount to a "defective organization of speech itself" and that result in "systematically
The critical social theorist plays a similar role in her efforts to promote the autonomy of a community by guiding it to self-understanding. The social critic must, no less than an analyst, employ a different kind of persuasion and reasoning in therapeutic critique, since she is not seeking mutual understanding as she would in ordinary dialogue but rather is assisting the "patient" to reconstruct his mistaken self-understanding as part of a process of emancipation. In place of Freud's mistaken meta-psychological explanations, Habermas anchors his theory in language. Language is not just the medium of psychoanalytic dialogue, it is the source of critical standards that guide emancipatory self-reflection.
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Gadamer immediately and repeatedly challenged Habermas's quasi-transcendental grounding of critique, arguing that Habermas erred by attempting to articulate a traditionindependent standard of rationality, and also by underestimating the critical element within every hermeneutical appropriation. Habermas's psychoanalytic model of social criticism brings into sharp focus his misguided hopes for a critical inquiry that can transcend the critic's hermeneutical situation. Because the social critic is embedded in a traditionary horizon of understanding no less than any other person, Gadamer insisted that the task of unmasking a prejudice always takes place against the background of an entire network of "prejudices." Consequently, in "the realm of practical reason there is simply no analogy 11 to the knowing analyst who guides the productive reflective processes of the analysand." Gadamer pressed further by insisting that psychoanalysis itself always operates within, and is parasitic upon, the primordial and inescapable hermeneutical situation that girds understanding. Tradition itself is no proof of validity, at any rate not in instances where reflection demands proof. But that is the point: Where does reflection demand proof? Everywhere? The finiteness of human existence and the intrinsic particularity of reflection seem to me to make that impossible.
. . . . In light of such considerations . . . Habermas's analogy between psychoanalytical and sociological theory becomes problematic. For where is the latter to find its limit? Where in Habermas's scheme of things does the patient stop and the social partnership step in in its unprofessional right? . . . The inevitable consequence seems to be that the emancipatory consciousness cannot stop short of the dissolution of every obligation to restraint-and thus that its guiding light must be the vision of an anarchistic utopia. This, of course, seems to me a hermeneutically false consciousness.
14 Gadamer did not argue against the claimed accomplishments of psychoanalytic practice any more than he denied the powerful transformations wrought by natural science. He insisted only that Habermas erred by not recognizing that all methodological attitudes, even when directed toward emancipation from natural, cultural or psychological constraints, are subordinated to the hermeneutical dimension of all human understanding.
II. Ricoeur's Critical Hermeneutics: Meditations on Freud.
Ricoeur famously addressed the Gadamer-Habermas debate with the goal of dissolving false dichotomies without reducing the exchange to a superficial and univocal resolution.
Rejecting a stark choice between the humility of the hermeneutical 15 consciousness of belonging and the defiance of the critical consciousness of distanciation, Ricoeur asks whether it is "possible to formulate a hermeneutics that would render justice to the critique of ideology, that would show the necessity of the latter at the very heart of its Because psychoanalytic theory was the touchstone of the debate, Ricoeur's intervention can be understood fully only by considering his reading of Freud. In Freud and Philosophy, he addressed the psychoanalytic challenge to religious faith with a detailed and nuanced exegesis that offered a deceptively simple theme: we must be suspicious of our beliefs, and yet we must believe. In some of his most frequently quoted passages, Ricoeur elegantly describes the "double possibility" that is the quandary of modernity: we must simultaneously be ready to interrogate idols but also to listen to symbols. The questions the forming of the covenant among the brothers whereby they agreed not to repeat among themselves the murder of the father. This covenant is highly significant, for it puts an end to a repetition of the act of parricide; by prohibiting fratricide, the covenant engenders a history. But Freud is much more preoccupied with the symbolic repetition of the murder in the totem meal than with the conciliation among the brothers, which makes possible the reconciliation with the father image henceforward engraved in the hearts of men. Why not link the destiny of faith with this fraternal conciliation, rather than with the perpetual repetition of the parricide?
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This is the role of critical hermeneutics: to listen to the masters of suspicion without becoming entangled in their myopic attention to one feature of the interpretive process.
III. Critical Hermeneutics and Postmodern Psychotherapeutic Practice.
The Gadamer-Habermas debate was distorted from the beginning because it was conducted in Freud's canonical shadow. Habermas attempted to sidestep Freud's metapsychology, while Gadamer rejected its relevance for social critique outright; both, however, remained in the grip of Freud's legacy. Since the debate, Freudian psychoanalysis has been the target of blistering criticism, and "independent studies have begun to converge toward a verdict . . . that there is literally nothing to be said, scientifically or therapeutically, to the advantage of the entire Freudian system or any of its component dogmas." As the 31 Freudian theoretical corpus crumbles, it is illuminating to return to Ricoeur's distinctive reading of Freud and to extend his mediation of the Gadamer-Habermas debate by connecting his critical hermeneutics to subsequent developments in psychotherapeutic
practice.
An emerging "postmodern" account of psychotherapeutic practice returns to the primacy of Freud's "talking cure" by reconceptualizing psychotherapy as hermeneutics, rhetoric and narrative. Postmodern psychotherapists engage clients in a dialogue for the 32 purpose of augmenting the client's capacity for successful interaction; therapeutic dialogue is not a tool or method, it is the therapy. Therapy is not empowering because the "expert"
analyst decodes the client's situation according to a theoretical template. Instead, therapy is an actively shared participation in revising the client's lived social narratives, beginning with the hermeneutical activity of discernment and extending through the rhetorical activity of elaborating the client's situation. Postmodern psychotherapy exemplifies critical hermeneutics because it is a process of broadening the client's lived narratives rather than simply a site for communicating expert knowledge to the client. The therapist can't persuade the client to revise a life-narrative at will, because there simply is no "self" standing outside the narrative to do the editing. Consequently, psychotherapy is a process of broadening the client's successful participation in socially structured narratives that are beyond the client's direction, principally by disrupting the mistaken sense of necessity by collaboratively 33 revising the narratives of the session. Ken Gergen has emphasized that the goal of revising 34 client narratives is not to approximate an ideal narrative; rather, the goal is to permit the client to experience the malleability of narrative reality so as to enable the client "to participate in the continuous process of creating and transforming meaning."
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Harlene Anderson's "philosophical stance" of "not-knowing" exemplifies this perspective by focusing on the need for a genuine conversation, in which the therapist accepts her role as a co-expert who facilitates a collaborative dialogue rather than an expert who provides an answer. Anderson's stance of "not-knowing" is not quiesence in the face 36 of ideology; rather, the therapist to exercises expertise by "suspending" her urge to diagnose,
by not "establishing understanding, explanation, and interpretations based on prior experiences, formed truths, and knowledge." In short, the therapist is an expert only in the 37 process of facilitating dialogic and reflective conversation, rather than in the content of her client's narrative.
The postmodern approach to psychotherapeutic dialogue acknowledges that critique is hermeneutical, but it also recognizes the validity and necessity of a structured dialogic inquiry that draws upon methodologies and empirically-based studies. In this way, Gadamer's conservative insistence on the limits of finitude by embracing the critical potential within a dialogue that does not purport to differentiate between symbols and idols in advance.
Within the therapeutic context, critical hermeneutics is an effort to disrupt rigid narrative constructions that have become problematic for the client, and also an effort to discover the unhelpful extension of certain localized realities (e.g., anger) to more generalized ways of being (e.g., depression). A critical hermeneutics founded on this practice begins by recognizing that the critic has access only to ordinary hermeneutical and rhetorical competencies, but also recognizes that she may engage these competencies in a disciplined 
Conclusion
There are myriad paths of productive thinking "after Ricoeur;" undoubtedly, some are not yet apparent to us. One promising avenue is the rejuvenation and extension of Ricoeur's critique of Freud and his related intervention in the Gadamer-Habermas debate. The philosophical stance of "not-knowing," as deployed in a disciplined effort to facilitate a therapeutic conversation, is a theoretically-informed practical engagement that provides a 1. As a law professor, I am interested in exploring these themes within the venues of legal practice and legal theory. I note this particular interest by way of explanation rather than apology. I agree with Gadamer's assessment that legal practice has "exemplary significance" for hermeneutical philosophy, see Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (Joel Weinsheimer & Donald Marshall rev. trans.) (Crossroad: New York, 2 rev. ed. 1989), 324-341 ("The exemplary nd significance of legal hermeneutics"), even while recognizing that the self-understanding of lawyers can be improved by attending to hermeneutical philosophy. I plan to articulate a critical legal theory modeled on postmodern psychotherapy as an example of what Ricoeur termed a "critical hermeneutics," in which understanding and explanation are incommiscibly fused, which is to say that they are joined as a tensive unity. This paper is a propaedeutic for that book project.
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